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Abstract 
The variations of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems of government 
represent the main framework of analysis of this study. Extremely different factors of the 
political process and inter-institutional relations, which are the conditions for defining 
different systems of government, can be indicators for distinguishing typical and atypical 
systems of government. In this sense, the purpose of this article is to determine whether the 
peculiarities of the institution of the vote of no confidence in governments in several post-
Soviet semi-presidential countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Russia) can predetermine the atypicality of these systems of government. It is argued 
that the atypicality of the post-Soviet semi-presidentialism is often due to the fact that 
parliaments have the right to cast the votes of no confidence in governments, but the latter 
come in force only when they are supported by presidents, who may be empowered to choose 
between the dismissal of governments and the dissolution of legislatures. On one hand, 
such systems of government definitively tend to be semi-presidential. On the other hand, 
the atypical responsibility of governments to parliaments denies the semi-presidential 
nature of systems of governments largely in favor of presidentialism. This determines 
that against the backdrop of traditional generalizations of different systems of 
government, they are formally and actually constructed as “constitutional hybrids” in six 
post-Soviet countries (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia) 
and therefore can be positioned both as cases of atypical semi-presidentialism and instances of 
incomplete presidentialism. At the same time, such cases are unique and must be 
classified as exceptional ones. 
 
Keywords: system of government, semi-presidentialism, the vote of no confidence in 
government, atypicality, post-Soviet countries. 
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Introduction 
 
In modern republics, there are different variants of presidentialism, 
parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism. At the same time, extremely different 
factors of the political process and inter-institutional relations, which are often 
the predictors of defining and distinguishing different types of systems of 
government, can simultaneously be the indicators of distinguishing between typical 
and atypical systems of government. Therefore, within the framework of the 
proposed study, the issue of analyzing the peculiarities of the institution of the vote of no 
confidence in governments in (constitutional) semi-presidential systems of 
government, especially in the post-Soviet countries, remains reasonably acute. 
Accordingly, the purpose of the article is to determine whether the institution of the 
vote of no confidence in governments in (constitutional) semi-presidential systems of 
government in the post-Soviet countries predetermines the atypicality of these systems 
of government. To accomplish this purpose, the following research tasks should be 
solved: to determine typical constitutional systems of government (presidentialism, 
parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism) within the framework of the republican 
form of government; to find out the essence and specifics of typical semi-
presidential system of government (semi-presidentialism); to analyze the conditions 
and peculiarities of the use of the votes of no confidence in governments as an 
attribute of atypicality of semi-presidential systems of government on the 
example of the post-Soviet countries. This is largely made on the basis of an appeal 
to the theoretical and empirical literature on typical semi-presidential systems of 
government, or certain aspects of the political process and inter-institutional 
relations that directly or indirectly indicate the typicality of semi-presidential 
systems of government and which include the studies by Andrew Arato, Jose A. 
Cheibub, Robert Elgie, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, Vitaliy Lytvyn, Sean 
Müller, Gianfranco Pasquino, and Matthew S. Shugart.
1
 In addition, this is done in 
                                               
1  Andrew Arato, “The New Democracies and the American Constitutional Design,” 
Constellations 7, no. 3 (2000): 316-40; Jose A. Cheibub, Zachary Elkins and Tom 
Ginsburg, “Beyond Presidentialism and Parliamentarism,” British Journal of Political 
Science 44, no. 3 (2014): 515-44; Robert Elgie, “The Classification of Democratic 
Regime Types: Conceptual Ambiguity and Contestable Assumptions,” European Journal 
of Political Research 33, no. 2 (1998): 219-38; Robert Elgie, “The Politics of Semi-
Presidentialism,” in Semi-Presidentialism in Europe, ed. Robert Elgie (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999): 1-21; Robert Elgie, “A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism: 
Variations on a Theme,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 98-112; Robert Elgie, 
“Semi-Presidentialism: An Increasingly Common Constitutional Choice,” in Semi-
Presidentialism and Democracy, eds. Robert Elgie, Sophia Moestrup, and Yu-Shan Wu 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011): 1-20; Vitaliy Lytvyn, Atrybuty ta Riznovydy 
Napivprezydentskoi Systemy Pravlinnia v Yevropi: Instytutsiino-Protsesualnyi i 
Politychno-Povedinkovyi Aspekty (Attributes and varieties of semi-presidential system of 
government in Europe: institutional, procedural, political and behavioral aspects) (Lviv: 
Lvivskyi Natsionalnyi Universytet Imeni Ivana Franka (Ivan Franko National University 
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the researches, which directly appeal to the phenomenon of atypical semi-
presidentialism mainly on the example of the post-Soviet countries and which 
include the studies by Galina Andreeva, Zbihniev Bialoblotskyi, William A. 
Clark, Steven M. Fish, Andreas Heinrich, Igor’ Kravets, Vitaliy Lytvyn, Edward 
Morgan-Jones, Іhor Osadchuk, Petra Schleiter, Anton Varnavskiy, and Oleg 
Zaznaev.
 2
 
                                                                                                                   
of Lviv), 2018); Sean Müller, “Presidential Power in Semi-Presidential Systems: The 
Case of Romania” (PhD diss., Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität Freiburg, 2006); 
Gianfranco Pasquino, “Nomination: Semi-presidentialism: A Political Model at Work,” 
European Journal of Political Research 31, no. 1 (1997): 128-46; Matthew S. Shugart, 
Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations: Hierarchies vs. Transactions in 
Constitutional Design (Irvine: University of California, Center for the Study of 
Democracy, 2005); Matthew S. Shugart, “Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive and 
Mixed Authority Patterns,” French Politics 3, no. 3 (2005): 323-51. 
2  Galina Andreeva, “Konstitutsionnaya Reforma 2004 Goda v Gruzii” (Constitutional 
Reform in Georgia, 2004), Kavkazskiy Uzel (Caucasian Knot), May 6, 2004, 
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/56759/; Zbihniev Bialoblotskyi, Stabilnist ta 
Efektyvnist Uriadiv u Politychnykh Systemakh Krain Skhidnoi Yevropy (Stability and 
Effectiveness of Governments in the Political Systems of the Countries of Eastern Europe) 
(Lviv: Lvivskyi Natsionalnyi Universytet Imeni Ivana Franka (Ivan Franko National 
University of Lviv), 2013); William A. Clark, “Boxing Russia: Executive-Legislative 
Relations and the Categorization of Russia’s Regime Type,” Demokratizatsiya 19, no. 1 
(2010): 5-22; Steven M. Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia: the Failure of Open 
Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Andreas Heinrich, The Formal 
Political System in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan: a Background Study (Bremen: Research 
Centre for East European Studies, 2010); Igor’ Kravets, “Rossiyskaya Konstitutsiya i 
Problemy Effektivnosti ee Realizatsii” (The Constitution of the Russian Federation and 
the Problems of its Implementation Efficiency), Konstitutsionnoe Pravo: 
Vostochnoevropeyskoe Obozrenie (Constitutional Law: Eastern European Review) 4, no. 
45 (2003): 65-78; Vitaliy Lytvyn, “Republicanism with the Position of Superpresident: 
Differentiation of Presidential and Semi-Presidential Systems of Government with 
Superpresidents,” Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review 15, no. 2 (2015): 
289-318; Edward Morgan-Jones and Petra Schleiter, “Governmental Change in а 
President-Parliamentary Regime: The Case of Russia 1994-2003,” Post-Soviet Affairs 20, 
no. 2 (2004): 132-63; Іhor Osadchuk, “Prezydentsializatsiia/Premieryzatsiia Systemy 
Instytutiv Vykonavchoi Vlady v Rosii” (The Presidentialization/Premierization of the 
System of Institutions of the Executive Power in Russia), Visnyk Dnipropetrovskoho 
Universytetu. Seriia: Filosofiia. Sotsiolohiia. Politolohiia (Bulletin of the Dnipropetrovsk 
University. Series: Philosophy. Sociology. Politology) 22, no. 3 (2012): 294-99; Іhor 
Osadchuk, “Konstytutsiini Referendumy/Konstytutsiini Reformy iak Chynnyky 
Prezydentsializatsii System Instytutiv Vykonavchoi Vlady u Krainakh SND” 
(Constitutional Referendums/Constitutional Reforms as the Factors of the 
Presidentialization of the Systems of Institutions of the Executive Power in the CIS 
Countries), Filosofiia i Politolohiia v Konteksti Suchasnoi Kultury (Philosophy and 
Political Science in the Context of Modern Culture) 6, no. 2 (2013): 73-80; Іhor 
Osadchuk, “Porivnialnyi Analiz Prezydentsializatsii System Pravlinnia u Bilorusi ta 
Kazakhstani” (Comparative Analysis of the Presidentialization of the Systems of 
Government in Belarus and Kazakhstan) (PhD diss., Lvivskyi Natsionalnyi Universytet 
Imeni Ivana Franka (Ivan Franko National University of Lviv), 2014); Anton Varnavskiy, 
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Their studies have become the theoretical and methodological basis of 
comparative Political Science for the understanding of the modern typical and 
atypical systems of government. It is in their view that new institutionalism and 
its variants and paradigms (in particular, on the basis of case-studies, binary, 
regional, cross-temporal and thematic comparisons as the methods of comparative 
Political Science) were chosen as the theoretical and methodological foundation of 
this article. Their combination made it possible to work out a coherent picture of the 
atypical character of the post-Soviet semi-presidentialism on the basis of the 
analysis of the votes of no confidence in governments. This was done based on the 
experience of six post-Soviet countries: Azerbaijan in the period 1995–2016 and 
since 2016, Belarus since 1996, Georgia in the period 2004–2013, Kazakhstan in 
the period 1995–2010, and Russia since 1993, which were considered as six 
separate analytical cases that are capable of shedding light on the phenomenon of 
atypical semi-presidentialism, taking into account the peculiarities of the votes 
of no confidence in governments. 
Given this, the article is structured into six parts. In the first part of the 
article, the attention is focused on the theoretical definition and understanding of 
presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism as typical constitutional 
systems of government, as well as on methodological issues. The second part of 
the article concentrates on the expediency of the distinction and the specificity 
of typical and atypical semi-presidentialism, in particular through the 
consideration of the logic of “origin” and “survival” of political institutions in 
the system of executive dualism. The third part of the article appeals to the 
theoretical framework of the understanding of the votes of no confidence in 
governments as an attribute of atypicality of semi-presidentialism. Instead, the fourth 
part of the article focuses on the empirical peculiarities of the understanding of the 
votes of no confidence in governments as an attribute of atypicality of semi-
presidentialism on the example of the analytical cases of the post-Soviet 
countries. As a result, the fifth part of the article offers a regional and cross-
temporal comparison of the votes of no confidence in governments in the six 
atypical cases of the post-soviet semi-presidentialism. Finally, the sixth and the last 
part of the article focuses on theoretical and practical remarks on the atypical 
                                                                                                                   
“Smeshannaya (Poluprezidentskaya) Forma Gosudarstvennogo Pravleniya: Prichiny i 
Usloviya Stanovleniya, Faktory Transformatsii v Sovremennykh Usloviyakh” (Mixed 
(Semi-Presidential) Form of Government: Causes and Conditions of Formation, 
Transformation Factors in Modern Conditions), Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskie Yavleniya i 
Protsessy (Socio-Economic Phenomena and Processes), no. 4 (2010): 297-300; Oleg 
Zaznaev, “Atipichnye Prezidentskie i Poluprezidentskie Sistemy” (Atypical Presidential 
and Semi-Presidential Systems), Uchenye Zapiski Kazanskogo Gosudarstvennogo 
Universiteta. Seriya: Gumanitarnye Nauki (Research Notes of Kazan State University. 
Series: Humanities) 147, no. 1 (2005): 54-69; Oleg Zaznaev, “The Presidentialization of a 
Semi-Presidential Regime: the Case of Russia”, in Politics and the Ruling Group in 
Putin’s Russia, ed. Stephen White (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 27-41. 
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character of the post-soviet semi-presidentialism. The article ends with the 
conclusions on the atypicality of semi-presidentialism in the context of the votes 
of no confidence in governments in the post-Soviet countries. 
 
 
Typical Constitutional Systems of Government: 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Semi-Presidentialism 
 
One of the best-proven methods of defining the constitutional and political 
systems of government, within the framework of the republican form of government, is 
the technique proposed by Robert Elgie.
3
 In this study, we use a modified form 
of Robert Elgie’s typology of systems of government, developed by Anatoliy 
Romaniuk and Vitaliy Lytvyn.
4
  
The latter define presidentialism or the presidential system of government 
as a constitutional and/or political system of the republican form of government, or 
system of government if simplified, which has a position of a popularly, either 
directly or indirectly, elected for a fixed term president and an institution of 
presidential administration or governmental cabinet, and even possibly a 
position of prime minister, whose members are collectively responsible 
exclusively to the president. At the same time, the members of the presidential 
administration or governmental cabinet may also be individually accountable 
to the parliament/the leading chamber of parliament, but this does not have a 
definitive influence and significance on the structuring of the system of 
government. 
Secondly, parliamentarism or the parliamentary system of government is 
defined as a constitutional (and/or political) system of the republican form of 
government, or system of government if simplified, where the president receives his 
or her powers on the basis of an indirect choice, for example, in the legislature, 
and the prime minister and the governmental cabinet are collectively 
responsible exclusively to the legislature. At the same time, government 
members, apart from the prime minister, can be individually responsible both to 
the president and the legislature, but this does not have a definitive meaning and 
influence on the structuring of the system of government. 
                                               
3  Elgie, “A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism,” 98-112. 
4  Lytvyn, Atrybuty ta Riznovydy Napivprezydentskoi Systemy Pravlinnia v Yevropi, 5; 
Anatoliy Romaniuk and Vitaliy Lytvyn, “Kontseptualizatsiia i Teoretychna Dystynktsiia 
Poniat ‘Forma Derzhavnoho Pravlinnia’ ta ‘Systema Derzhavnoho Pravlinnia’ u 
Politychnii Nautsi” (Conceptualization and Theoretical Distinction of the Concepts of 
‘Form of Government’ and ‘System of Government’ in Political Science), Naukovyi 
chasopys Natsionalnoho pedahohichnoho universytetu imeni M. P. Drahomanova 
(Scientific Journal of the National Pedagogical University named after M.P. 
Dragomanov) 20 (2016): 7. 
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Finally, semi-presidentialism or the semi-presidential system of government 
is defined as a constitutional and/or political system of the republican form of 
government, or system of government if simplified, which has a position of a 
popularly, either directly or indirectly, elected for a fixed term president, as well as 
an institution of the prime minister and the governmental cabinet that are 
necessarily collectively responsible at least to the legislature, and is characterized 
with an executive dualization by the president (necessarily as the head of state) and 
the prime minister (necessarily as the head of government) with the governmental 
cabinet. At the same time, the prime minister and the governmental cabinet can be 
collectively responsible both to the parliament and the head of state. Moreover, 
ministers of the governmental cabinet may be individually accountable to the 
parliament and/or the president, but this has no definitive meaning and influence on 
the structuring of the system of government. 
 
 
The Specifics of Typical and Atypical Semi-Presidentialism: 
the Logic of “Origin” and “Survival” of Political Institutions in 
the System of Executive Dualism 
 
In this context, special attention needs to be paid to the fact that, unlike 
presidentialism and parliamentarism, the typical semi-presidential system of 
government is necessarily characterized by a different and variable dualism of 
the executive. On one hand, this is necessarily conditioned functionally, i.e. at 
the level of alignment and opposition of the powers of the president and the 
prime minister as various centers of the executive branch. On the other hand, it 
may be possibly caused discretionary and institutionally, i.e. in the context of 
“origin”/formation and “survival”/responsibility of governmental cabinets as a 
part of the dual executive power. Given this, the average logic of “origin” and 
“survival” of political and power institutions in the system of executive dualism, 
under the conditions of typical semi-presidentialism, is reflected in table 1. 
On the basis of such a correlation, it was discovered that the specificity of 
typical semi-presidentialism is that voters choose two “agents”, to whom they 
delegate the rights and the ability to act on their behalf, i.e. the head of 
state/president and parliament. Therefore, typical semi-presidentialism is 
determined by the “double legitimacy” of the main “agents” and also by the fact 
that these “agents” are simultaneously capable of structuring and streamlining the 
process of the governmental cabinets’ formation, functioning and sometimes 
responsibility, as a result of which typical semi-presidentialism is characterized by the 
attribute of executive dualism.
5
 This means that the systematic and permanent 
                                               
5 Lytvyn, Atrybuty ta Riznovydy Napivprezydentskoi Systemy Pravlinnia v Yevropi, 94.  
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feature of typical semi-presidentialism is the double or dual nature of the 
“origin” and implementation of the executive, but not the double or dual nature 
of the responsibility of the executive.
6
 At the same time, typical semi-presidentialism 
ambiguously subordinates the governmental cabinet to the president and the 
parliament, since the “survival” of the government depends, on one hand, on the 
confidence or lack of no confidence of the legislature, and, on the other hand, on 
the popular election of the president as a channel for voters to influence the 
process of governance in a country.
7
 
It is noteworthy that typical semi-presidentialism is institutionally, 
politically and behaviorally determined. On one hand, typical semi-
presidentialism is determined exogenously, i.e. through the actual content of 
constitutions and the combination of traditions and circumstances. On the other 
hand, it is structured endogenously, i.e. due to the composition of parliamentary 
majority or minority and the position of a president in relation to the 
parliamentary majority or minority.
8
 Accordingly, typical semi-
presidentialism is characterized by the specific hierarchical and transactional 
relations in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet/prime minister–
legislature”. Thus, this system of government, especially in the context of 
different institutional rules and formal or actual powers of presidents, 
cabinets/prime ministers and parliaments, may also be classified differently in 
practice, even within the same constitutional definition. Nevertheless, typical 
semi-presidentialism is generally outlined by such attributes of the delegation of 
powers and responsibility between “agents” and “principals” as: a restrained and 
moderate model of the separation of powers and an appropriate system of checks 
and balances; popular election of the president for a fixed term; the collective 
responsibility of the prime minister and the governmental cabinet to the legislature; 
the actual “securitization” of the president from the interference in his or her 
activities by other institutions and branches of state power; actual or formal, but 
multi-step and different deconcentration or dualization of the executive power 
between a president (as the head of state) and a prime minister (as the head of the 
cabinet); dual nature of the “origin” and implementation of the executive power, but 
not dual nature of the responsibility of the executive power. This means that the 
relations of the delegation of powers and responsibility from the 
“principals” (i.e. voters) to the “agents” (i.e. to the president and parliament, and 
from them to the governmental cabinet and civil servants), and vice versa, are 
quite obvious, unambiguous and indisputable in the case of typical semi-
presidentialism as in Austria since 1945, Ireland since 1937, Lithuania since 
                                               
6  Ibid, 101. 
7  Ibid, 94. 
8  Maurice Duverger, “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government”, 
European Journal of Political Research 8, no. 2 (1980): 165-87. 
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1992, Poland since 1992, Portugal since 1976, Romania since 1991, Finland 
since 1919, and France since 1962, etc. 
Instead, there are some countries, including the post-Soviet ones such as 
Azerbaijan since 1995, Belarus since 1996, Georgia in 2004–2013, Kazakhstan since 
1995, Kyrgyzstan in 1993–2010, and Russia since 1993, where the constitutional 
design of the systems of government (which are definitively and nominally 
positioned as semi-presidential ones) and formal or actual parameters of inter-
institutional relations in the chain of the delegation of powers and responsibility 
between “agents” and “principals” do not correspond to the outline of typical semi-
presidentialism. In contrast, the constitutional design and parameters of inter-
institutional relations intuitively fall under the phenomenon of atypical semi-
presidentialism, or atypicality of semi-presidentialism. This, for example, may be 
reflected in the fact that certain political institutions have ambiguous powers over the 
peculiarities of the mandatory logic of “origin”/formation and 
“survival”/responsibility of other political institutions. Therefore, they modify the 
model of the delegation of powers and responsibility, which is specific to typical 
semi-presidentialism. Thus, in political practice (which is often a pattern of 
regional specificity and mobilization of the post-Soviet countries themselves), it 
happens that some political institutions (first of all, presidents) are defined as 
“main principals” of other political institutions, instead of being positioned as 
“agents” of voters. It is noteworthy that this is due not only to political and 
behavioral reasons, but also due to institutional and procedural explanations (that 
is to specific or atypical constitutional regulations of semi-presidentialism). 
Therefore, attention needs to be focused on the main distinctions between typical and 
atypical semi-presidentialism, in particular through the prism of which concern the 
details of some of the manifestations of inter-institutional relations that delegate 
powers and responsibility between voters and representatives, and generally 
between “agents” and “principals”. 
 
 
The Votes of No Confidence in Governments as an Attribute of 
Atypicality of Semi-Presidentialism: Theoretical Overview 
 
In this context, it is noteworthy that there is a significant field for 
theoretical, methodological, practical and empirical maneuvers, an interesting 
expression of which in the context of defining and studying semi-presidentialism is 
an interpretation of the essence and direction of the responsibility of the governmental 
cabinet and/or of the prime minister to the legislature. In this regard, Jose A. 
Cheibub, Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, Arend Lijphart, Juan J. Linz, Sean 
Müller, Gianfranco Pasquino, and Giovanni Sartori indicate that the parliamentary 
responsibility of the governmental cabinet and/or prime minister in the framework 
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of semi-presidentialism is manifested in the parliamentary confidence.
9
 In 
particular, in the fact that they are dependent or independent of the 
confidence/investiture of the legislature, but necessarily can be released or 
deprived of authority as a result of the use of the vote of no confidence. In other 
words, they are subjects to the parliamentary confidence/investiture or 
parliamentary no confidence (or both to confidence/investiture and no 
confidence), and, in any case, need support of the parliamentary majority.
10 
Therefore, as Vitaliy Lytvyn observes, political responsibility of the 
governmental cabinet and of the prime minister in typical semi-presidentialism is 
traditionally more amplified in the direction of the parliament.
11
 Since if the 
legislature participates in the governmental cabinet formation, then it must express 
its position (the vote of investiture or confidence) regarding the formation of the 
governmental cabinet, in particular concerning the appointment of the prime 
minister and the approval of the composition and/or the program of the 
governmental cabinet. In addition, the legislature, regardless of the design of 
inter-institutional relations, is empowered to verify the results of 
government’s activities, embodied in the possibility of its early resignation (i.e. 
in the vote of no confidence). 
Governments often terminate their powers on the basis of the directly 
anticipated procedure of the parliamentary vote of no confidence. This is a 
parliamentary initiative caused by the unsatisfactory, according to the opinion of 
oppositional, but sometimes even pro-governmental deputies, state of execution 
by a government, a prime minister or a separate minister of their powers. By 
disapproving the political line, certain actions or bills of governmental cabinet, 
there is the vote on the early termination of powers of an appropriate government, 
prime minister or separate minister in parliament. This means that the subject of 
the vote of no confidence in government can be a minister or a prime minister, but 
most often the full composition of a governmental cabinet. Traditionally, the 
usual/simple and positive/constructive votes of no confidence are distinguished. 
In the first case, the legislature proposes the early termination of powers of the 
                                               
9  Jose A. Cheibub, Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg, “Beyond 
Presidentialism,” 515-44; Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms 
and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1999): 117-18; Juan J. Linz, “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It 
Make а Difference?”, in The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative 
Perspectives, eds. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994): 48; Müller, Presidential Power in Semi-Presidential Systems; 
Pasquino, “Nomination,” 128-46; Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional 
Engineering: an Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (New York: New York 
University Press, 1997): 125. 
10  Lytvyn, Atrybuty ta Riznovydy Napivprezydentskoi Systemy Pravlinnia v Yevropi, 94. 
11  Ibid, 101. 
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object of the vote of no confidence. If the vote of no confidence is voted by the 
required number of deputies of parliament or the leading chamber of 
parliament, then a minister, prime minister or governmental cabinet will 
terminate their powers ahead of time. In the second case, it is a question of the 
early termination of powers of the object of the vote of no confidence, but 
provided with the simultaneous nomination of a new minister, prime minister and/or a 
new composition/program of governmental cabinet depending on the peculiarities of 
the vote of investiture in a certain country. Accordingly, the expression of the 
constructive vote of no confidence is simultaneously the successful vote of investiture 
in a new minister, prime minister or governmental cabinet in general.
12
 
In this context, it is definitely not always clear how “strong” should be the 
attribute of compulsory collective responsibility of the institutions/positions of 
prime minister and governmental cabinet to legislature in the conditions of semi-
presidentialism. This is due to the fact that a prime minister and a governmental 
cabinet actually are not in general or necessarily collectively responsible to the 
legislature in some systems of government, which definitively lean towards 
atypical semi-presidentialism.  
In the outlined context, such an attribute of some cases of institutional 
semi-presidentialism as the mandatory confirmation of the parliamentary vote of no 
confidence in a government or a prime minister by the head of state or other 
political institution is particularly interesting. This is quite often the case when a 
parliament is a “puppet” of a president and, in reality, cannot contradict this 
institution in the executive. Moreover, the necessity to confirm the parliamentary 
vote of no confidence in government is sometimes provided and regulated even 
constitutionally. It is the case of systems of government, where constitutions are 
idiosyncratic documents.
13
 Instead, it is clear that the unilateral nature and 
requirement of the resignation of government, following the results of the 
successful parliamentary vote of no confidence (in the government or the prime 
minister), should be inherent to typical semi-presidentialism. Or, in other words, 
there should be an instrument of the independent parliamentary vote of no 
confidence in government, but not the parliamentary condemnation/censure of 
government’s activity or the parliamentary recommendation for a president to 
resign a government. However, in the context of semi-presidentialism, this is not 
provided definitively, since the element of subjectivity would be substantially 
contained in such a definition based on additional attributes. Given this and the fact 
                                               
12  Nadiia Panchak-Bialoblotska, Uriady Menshosti v Yevropeiskykh Parlamentskykh 
Demokratiiakh (Minority Government in the European Parliamentary Democracies) 
(Lviv: Prostir-M (SPACE-M), 2017): 207-208.  
13  Robert Elgie, “What is Semi-presidentialism and Where is it Found”, in Semi-
Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study, eds. Robert Elgie and Sophia 
Moestrup (London: Routledge, 2007): 1-13; Elgie, “Semi-Presidentialism: An 
Increasingly,” 1-20.  
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that the study shows the approach to the definition of semi-presidentialism, which 
is based only on the basic or generalized attributes of systems of government, as 
well as the fact that there is no reference to the actual powers of political actors 
in the proposed definition of semi-presidentialism, it is generally argued that the 
cases with the mandatory necessity of confirming the parliamentary vote of no 
confidence regarding prime minister or government by the head of state leans towards 
atypical semi-presidentialism, if the nature of the parliamentary vote of no 
confidence regarding the government or prime minister is constitutionalized. 
The conclusion is an understanding of the following specific peculiarities 
of the analyzed distinctive cases of atypical semi-presidentialism. Firstly, a 
legislature can determine the collective and not only the individual “survival” of a 
governmental cabinet. Secondly, the presidential disapproval of the 
parliamentary vote of no confidence in a government or prime minister in 
theory (constitutionally) and in fact (politically) may be the cause of an inter-
institutional crisis in a system of government. This means that, regardless of the 
nature and procedural logic of the parliamentary vote of no confidence in a 
government and/or prime minister, semi-presidentialism is positioned as a 
system of government, where there is a “continuous” compulsory collective 
responsibility of the government and of the prime minister to the legislature, or 
where the legislature has the initiative to raise the question of the collective 
responsibility of government. Instead, all other and additional refinements and 
attributes are only the auxiliary rules for the classification of systems of 
government, which should only be used in the typology of semi-presidentialism.
14
 
 
 
The Votes of No Confidence in Governments as an Attribute 
of Atypicality of Semi-Presidentialism: the Post-Soviet Cases 
 
In order to demonstrate this, we shall analyze the specificities of the 
institution of the vote of no confidence in governments in atypical semi-
presidential (constitutional) and similar systems of government in the six post-
Soviet countries (Azerbaijan in 1995–2016 and since 2016, Belarus since 1996, 
Georgia in the period 2004–2013, Kazakhstan in the period 1995–2007 and since 
2007, Kyrgyzstan in the period 1993–2010, and Russia since 1993) with the aim 
of determining the typical or atypical nature of these systems. 
In Belarus, according to the article 106 of the Constitution, the 
government is accountable to the president and responsible in front of the 
parliament.
15
 The item 5 of the article 106 states that the government terminates 
                                               
14  Lytvyn, Atrybuty ta Riznovydy Napivprezydentskoi Systemy Pravlinnia v Yevropi, 80. 
15  “Constitution of the Republic of Belarus of March 15, 1994 (with Alterations and 
Amendments Adopted at the Republican Referendums of November 24, 1996 and of 
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its powers before the president, when the House of Representatives (the lower 
chamber of the Belarusian parliament) takes the vote of no confidence in the 
government. Nevertheless, the prime minister may demand the vote of confidence 
from the House of Representatives in connection with the government program, 
and any issue put forward for the discussion in the lower chamber of the 
parliament. If the legislature takes the vote of no confidence in the government, 
within ten days the president has the right to decide on the resignation of the 
government or on the dissolution of the House of Representatives and 
announcing new parliamentary elections. If the dismissal of the government is 
rejected, then the latter must continue to perform its duties. At the same time, 
the president has the right to decide on the resignation of the government and 
the dismissal of any member of the government on his or her own initiative.
16
 
Accordingly, the president finally determines whether to make the government resign. 
In Georgia, one third of the nominal composition of the parliament could 
initiate the vote of no confidence in government in the period 2004 to 2013. In 
order to express the vote of no confidence in government, the support of the absolute 
majority of parliamentary deputies (of the nominal composition of the parliament) 
was necessary. After expressing the vote of no confidence in the government, the 
president received an alternative, that is to make the government resign or to 
challenge the decision of the parliament. If the parliament (not earlier than 90 
and not later than 100 days) repeatedly expressed the vote of no confidence in the 
government, then the president was obliged to make the government resign, or to 
dissolve the parliament and appoint its extraordinary elections (the item 1 of the 
article 81 of the previous revision of the Constitution).
17
 In addition, the procedure 
of the unconditional vote of no confidence in government was foreseen: if not 
more than 15 days and not later than 20 days after the decision on this the 3/5 
majority of the nominal composition of the parliament expressed the vote of 
no confidence in the government, then the president was obliged to take the 
decision on the resignation of the government. Moreover, in the case of the 
resignation of the government, the president of Georgia did not have the right to 
appoint the same person or represent the same candidate from the previous 
government for the position of the prime minister in the next government. If 
the parliament did not succeed in expressing the vote of no confidence in the 
government, then the re-issue of the vote of no confidence in the government was 
not allowed within the next six months (the item 2 of the article 81 of the previous 
revision of the Constitution).
18
 
                                                                                                                   
October 17, 2004),” WIPO, accessed December 1, 2018, http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=184404. 
16  Ibid. 
17  Andreeva, “Konstitutsionnaya Reforma.” 
18  Ibid. 
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In Kazakhstan during the period 1995 to 2007, the parliament on the 
initiative of not less than one fifth of the nominal number of its deputies could 
express the vote of no confidence in the government by the 2/3 majority of the 
nominal number of deputies from each of the chambers (Mazhilis and Senate) of 
the parliament (the article 53 of the previous revision of the Constitution). After 
that, the president considered accepting or rejecting the resignation of the 
government within ten days. In the case of rejection of the government 
resignation declared in connection with the parliamentary vote of no confidence, 
the president had the right to dissolve the parliament (the article 70 of one of the 
revisions of the Constitution).
19
 It is also interesting that the government is a 
collegiate body, which is responsible to the president and the parliament in all its 
activities in Kazakhstan, even since 2007 (the item 2 of the article 64 of the current 
revision of the Constitution).
20
 According to the article 70 of the Constitution, the 
government claims to the president of the resignation in the case of the vote of 
no confidence expressed by Mazhilis (the lower chamber of the parliament) or by 
the parliament in general. Within ten days, the president should consider 
accepting or rejecting the resignation of the government. Herewith, the adoption 
of the resignation of the prime minister means the termination of powers of the 
entire government. Instead, the president entrusts the government with the 
further exercise of its authority in the event of the rejection of the resignation of 
the government. Nevertheless, the president of Kazakhstan has the right to take the 
decision to terminate the powers of the government and dismiss any of its members 
on his or her own initiative.
21
 Therefore, the parliamentary vote of no 
confidence in government does not automatically lead to its resignation, since it 
depends on the position and will of the president. 
In Kyrgyzstan during the period 1993 to 2003, the Assembly of People’s 
Representatives (which should be called the upper chamber of the parliament) could 
express the vote of no confidence regarding the prime minister. After the Assembly 
of People’s Representatives expressed its no confidence in the prime minister, the 
president had the right to declare the resignation of the prime minister or could 
decide not to agree with the decision of the Assembly of People’s 
Representatives. If the vote of no confidence in the prime minister was repeatedly 
voiced within three months, then the president was forced to announce the 
resignation of the prime minister or to dissolve the Assembly of People’s 
Representatives (the item 5 of the article 71 of one of the revisions of the 
                                               
19  “Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of August 30, 1995 (with Amendments of 
October 7, 1998),” WIPO, accessed December 1, 2018, http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=406284. 
20  “Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan of August 30, 1995 (with Amendments of 
March 10, 2017),” Akorda, accessed December 1, 2018, http://www.akorda.kz/ 
en/official_documents/constitution. 
21  Ibid. 
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previous Constitution).
22
 In 2003–2007, after the parliament (the Jogorku Kenesh) 
expressed the vote of no confidence in the government, the president also had the 
right to decide on the resignation of the government or could decide not to agree 
with the decision of the parliament (the item 6 of the article 72 of one of the 
revisions of the previous Constitution).
23
 If within three months the vote of no 
confidence in the government was repeated, then the president was obliged to 
announce the resignation of the government or to dissolve the parliament (the item 
7 of the article 72 of one of the revisions of the previous Constitution).
24
 Similarly, the 
responsibility of government in Kyrgyzstan was settled in 2007–2010. After 
expressing the vote of no confidence in the government, the president had the 
right either to decide on the resignation of the government, or to disagree with the 
decision of the parliament (the item 6 of the article 71 of one of the revisions of 
the previous Constitution). In the event that the Jogorku Kenesh re-approved 
its decision to express the vote of no confidence in the government within 
three months, the president was obliged to resign the government or to dissolve 
the parliament and appoint its early elections (the item 7 of the article 71 of one 
of the revisions of the previous Constitution).
25
 
In Russia, the president retains the influence on the dismissal of the prime 
minister, since the relationships between the president and the prime minister are 
hierarchical. However, the prime minister is formally responsible to the president 
and the parliament. In addition, the vote of no confidence in the government in this 
country has no immediate effect. After the State Duma (the lower house of the 
parliament) expresses the vote of no confidence in the government, the president 
has the right to announce the resignation of the government or to disagree with the 
decision of the legislature. When the vote of no confidence in the government is 
repeated within 3 months, the president has a choice: to adopt the resignation of the 
government and appoint a new head of government or to keep the current 
government and hold new parliamentary elections within four months (the article 
109 and 117 of the current Constitution).
26
 As a result, the parliamentary votes of no 
confidence in governments in Russia are rare in political practice. Only one of them 
was effective and received the support of the absolute majority in the legislature, in 
particular against the governmental cabinet of Chernomyrdin in 1995. Although, it 
                                               
22  “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of May 5, 1993 (as Amended October 21, 1998 by 
the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic, No. 134),” Confinder, accessed December 1, 2018, 
http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/kyrgyz_const.pdf. 
23  “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of May 5, 1993 (as Amended February 18, 2003 by 
the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic, No. 40),” Constitution Net, accessed December 1, 2018, 
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Kyrgyzstan%20Constitution.pdf. 
24  Ibid. 
25  “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic of October 21, 2007,” Confinder, accessed December 1, 
2018, http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Kyrgyzstan2007English.pdf.  
26  “Constitution of the Russian Federation of December 12, 1993 (as Amended up to 
Federal Constitutional Law No. 11-FKZ of July 21, 2014),” WIPO, accessed December 1, 
2018, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=441970. 
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was not supplemented with the consent of the president to stop the work of the 
government, and was marked with the continuation of the government’s 
functioning, accordingly.
27
 After that, the State Duma within ten days initiated 
another vote of no confidence in the government, but it was ineffective because it 
did not receive sufficient parliamentary support.
28
 Therefore, it is obvious that even 
at the constitutional level the parliamentary responsibility of the government in 
Russia turns into a blank sound and serves as a tool for the presidentialization of the 
system of government, that is for strengthening the presidential characteristics while 
simultaneously weakening the parliamentary components.
29
 In particular, as a result 
of the understanding that the dual responsibility of a governmental cabinet to the 
parliament and to the president (subjected to the desire of the head of state) may 
turn out to be exclusively the responsibility of a governmental cabinet to the 
president. Accordingly, both formal (institutional, procedural) and actual (political, 
behavioral) elimination of the parliament from the formation and responsibility of 
governments is outlined in the Russian system of government. The fact is that the 
elimination of the parliament is not only regulated through the norms of law, but 
also happens in political practice, since the head of state (especially before 1999) 
almost never wanted to listen to the thought of the legislature.
30
 
Finally, Azerbaijan is a very special case. The system of government in this 
country is often defined as a semi-presidential one. The fact is that one of the 
powers of Milli Majlis (the parliament of Azerbaijan) was to raise the question of 
the confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers (the government of Azerbaijan) in 
1995–2016 (the item 14 of the article 95 of the previous revision of the 
Constitution).
31
 At the same time, the president himself was obliged to make the 
decision on the resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers. However, according to the 
updated version of the article 98–1 of the Constitution, according to the results of 
the constitutional referendum of 2016, if the same convocation of Milli Majlis 
holds the vote of no confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers twice during one year, 
then the president is obliged to dissolve the parliament.
32
 At the same time, the 
president is empowered to resign the Cabinet of Ministers (the item 6 of the 
article 109 of the current revision of the Constitution). In addition, the Cabinet of 
Ministers resigns on the day of the appointment of a newly elected president (the 
                                               
27  Morgan-Jones and Schleiter, “Governmental Change in а President-Parliamentary 
Regime,” 132-63. 
28  Clark, “Boxing Russia,” 5-22. 
29  Zaznaev, “The Presidentialization,” 27-41; Osadchuk, “Prezydentsializatsiia/Premieryzatsiia,” 
294-99; Osadchuk, “Konstytutsiini Referendumy/Konstytutsiini Reformy,” 73-80. 
30  Bialoblotskyi, Stabilnist ta Efektyvnist Uriadiv; Lytvyn, Atrybuty ta Riznovydy 
Napivprezydentskoi Systemy Pravlinnia v Yevropi, 322-23. 
31  “Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan of November 12, 1995 (with Amendments 
Through 2009),” Constitute Project, accessed December 1, 2018, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Azerbaijan_2009.pdf?lang=en.  
32  “Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan of  November 12, 1995 (with Amendments 
Through 2016),” Constitute Project, accessed December 1, 2018,  https:// 
www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Azerba ijan_2016.pdf.  
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article 116 of the current revision of the Constitution).
33
 Therefore, the parliamentary 
vote of no confidence in the government also does not automatically lead to the 
resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers, since this right belongs to the president. 
Following the idea of Robert Elgie, we note that the system of executive dualism 
or executive diarchy is not institutionalized and established in Azerbaijan.
34
 
Instead, according to Zbihniev Bialoblotskyi, Azerbaijan is characterized by a so-
called “super-presidential” system of government or by the system of government 
derived from the presidential one with the position of the prime minister.
35
 In 
other words, this country is determined by a “super-presidential” or “hyper-
presidential” semi-presidential system of government, because the president actually 
controls the composition and operations of the government in full.
36
 This is 
primarily due to the fact that even formally (not to mention the political 
practice) the president of Azerbaijan is endowed with considerable powers, for 
which virtually no political responsibility is foreseen.
37
 Therefore, taking into 
account the peculiarities of the vote of no confidence in government and the fact 
that the executive powers according to the article 99 of the Constitution 
(before and after its change in 2016) belong to the president (the head of state 
holding the executive powers is specific to the constitutional presidential system of 
government), as well as the fact of establishment of the positions of the first and 
other vice-presidents after 2016 (these positons are also typical for 
presidentialism), the constitutional system of inter-institutional relations in 
Azerbaijan (before and after the changes in 2016) should be understood as an 
atypical presidential, and not atypical semi-presidential system of government. 
 
 
A Regional and Cross-Temporal Comparison of the Votes of 
No Confidence in Governments in the Six Atypical Cases of 
the Post-Soviet Semi-Presidentialism 
 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that institutional and procedural features and 
parameters of the parliamentary responsibility and the early termination of 
governments under the conditions of atypical semi-presidentialism, which are 
primarily incorporated in the procedures of the votes of no confidence in 
governments, are correlated on the basis of several aspects. These include: which 
are the constitutional and institutional rules for making decisions on the 
resignation of governments; which restrictions are imposed on the procedures of 
                                               
33  Ibid. 
34  Elgie, “The Politics of Semi-Presidentialism,” 1-21; Elgie, “A Fresh Look at 
Semipresidentialism,” 98-112. 
35  Bialoblotskyi, Stabilnist ta Efektyvnist Uriadiv, 55-72.  
36  Arato, “The New Democracies,” 318; Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia, 205.  
37  Heinrich, The Formal Political System in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. 
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the votes of no confidence in governments; what are the consequences of different 
types and procedures of the votes of no confidence in governments; who may be 
the initiator of the vote of no confidence in government; what is the frequency 
of an announcement of the votes of no confidence in governments; what are the 
consequences of successful and unsuccessful votes of no confidence in 
governments. 
The comparison of procedural and institutional peculiarities of the votes 
of no confidence in governments in the atypical examples of semi-presidential and 
in the post-Soviet countries analyzed here generates the possibility of distinguishing 
several classification patterns.  
The first one, atypical post-Soviet semi-presidential countries are 
traditionally characterized by the fact that unicameral parliaments or lower 
chambers of bicameral parliaments are or were obliged to initiate and adopt 
the votes of no confidence in governments. The exceptions are represented by 
Kyrgyzstan during the period 1993 to 2003, where the upper house of the 
parliament was obliged to initiate and confirm the vote of no confidence in 
government, as well as by Kazakhstan during the period 1995 to 2007, where two 
chambers of the parliament were simultaneously obliged to initiate and 
adopt/confirm the vote of no confidence in government. However, the initiators 
of the votes of no confidence in governments are different depending on the 
share of the composition of legislatures (in order to simplify the requirements): 
one third in Belarus (since 1996), Georgia (in 2004–2013) and Kyrgyzstan (in 
2007–2010); one fifth in Kazakhstan (in 1995–2007 – necessarily from the two 
chambers of the parliament, since 2007 – either from one or two chambers of the 
parliament); and not recorded in Azerbaijan (since 1995), Kyrgyzstan (in 1993–2007) 
and Russia (since 1993).  
For the second one, in all atypical post-Soviet semi-presidential 
countries, the subjects of the votes of no confidence are actually current 
governments, less often – current governments and their programs, and never – 
current governments/prime ministers and new prime ministers/compositions of 
governments. Consequently, the constructive votes of no confidence in 
governments or their approximate variations are not inherent in the cases of 
atypical semi-presidentialism in the region, but instead only the simple votes of 
no confidence in governments that do not require additional investiture in 
alternative governments are applied (see detailed table 2).  
For the third category, the rules of decision-making on the votes of no 
confidence in governments in the countries analyzed also significantly differ 
and are divided into several groups. They operate or previously operated as the 
absolute majority systems in Azerbaijan (since 1995), Belarus (since 1996), 
Kazakhstan (since 2007), Kyrgyzstan (in the period 2007–2010), Russia (since 
1993), and partly in Georgia (in the period 2004–2013). They acted as the 
qualified majority systems in Kazakhstan (in the period 1995–2007), Kyrgyzstan 
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(in the period 1993–2007), and partly in Georgia (in the period 2004–2013). This 
means that only the absolute majority systems had been tested as the rule of 
decision-making on the votes of no confidence in governments in the countries 
with an atypical semi-presidential system of government at the time of analysis. 
Finally, the most frequent result of a successful vote of no confidence in 
government is the resignation or the rejection of the resignation of government as 
well as the resignation of government or the dissolution of legislature, while the 
most frequent consequence of an unsuccessful vote of no confidence in 
government is the confidence in it. 
 
 
Remarks on the Atypical Character 
of the Post-Soviet Semi-Presidentialism 
 
Thus, it is clear in a synthetic view that the parliaments in formally and 
definitively semi-presidential Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as in Georgia 
and Kyrgyzstan earlier have the right to cast the votes of no confidence in 
governments, but the latter come into force only when they are supported by 
presidents, who may even be additionally (with national differences) empowered 
to choose between the dismissal of governments and the dissolution of 
legislatures.
38
 It is regulated that the parliamentary responsibility of governments 
in the cases of atypical semi-presidentialism mentioned above is “of a ghastly 
character”, since governments are actually accountable to presidents.39 Consequently, 
the vote of no confidence in governments that do not lead to their resignation 
predetermines the atypicality of formally semi-presidential Belarus, Russia and 
Kazakhstan, as well as Georgia and Kyrgyzstan earlier. The similar construction 
of the vote of no confidence in governments is also peculiar for Azerbaijan, but the 
latter tends to be closer to an atypical presidentialism than to an atypical semi-
presidentialism.  
On the other hand, all the analyzed cases of atypical semi-presidentialism 
lean towards a “pure” presidentialism, albeit without such an attribute of inter-
institutional relations, as the separation of “origin” and “survival” of the 
branches of state power.
40
 Moreover, such cases of systems of government do not 
stimulate inter-institutional balances, checks and counterweights and do not 
guarantee political bargaining. Since each political actor, exercising unilateral 
powers, retains the potential for the postponing political conflicts’ resolution, 
thereby generating the risks of inter-institutional asymmetry, as well as institutional 
                                               
38  Lytvyn, “Republicanism with the Position of Superpresident,” 289-318. 
39  Kravets, “Rossiyskaya Konstitutsiya,” 73. 
40  Varnavskiy, “Smeshannaya (Poluprezidentskaya) Forma Gosudarstvennogo Pravleniya,” 
297-300. 
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and political stability.
41
 Instead, the outlined systems are determined primarily by 
electoral bargaining, which is tied to expectations of voters and thus “strengthens 
the powers of the last elected branch of government.”42 This means that although 
some modern cases of the post-Soviet atypical semi-presidentialism tend to be 
presidentialism they still need many occasions in order for one branch to threaten 
the existence of another.
43
 Even though the presidents can be assigned 
significant/decisive legislative or control powers under the circumstances of the 
post-Soviet atypical semi-presidentialism, that is they can carry out a 
transactional role in the process of law-making. 
Consequently, the attribution of the post-Soviet atypical semi-
presidentialism is conditioned by the fact that such a system of government 
formally remains semi-presidential rather than presidential one. There are 
several reasons for this. Firstly, a government is at least normatively in the 
hierarchical parliamentary control and dependence. Secondly, a parliament can take 
part in a government formation and/or in the approval of governmental program 
giving a government the vote of investiture. Thirdly, a parliament may force a 
government to resign due to the vote of no confidence. On the other hand, the 
involvement of legislature in cabinet formation and support, in such system of 
government or at least in most of its cases, is formally and actually limited, 
since a president can dissolve a parliament and independently form a 
governmental cabinet in the event that a parliament does not approve the candidacy 
of a prime minister proposed by a president within several attempts. 
However, the main characteristic of the post-Soviet atypical semi-
presidentialism analyzed in this study is the fact that a legislature has the right to 
put forward the vote or censure of no confidence in a government, but the latter 
comes into force only when a president supports it. Such self-evident formal and 
actual “anomalies” of atypical semi-presidentialism in practice lead to the 
intuitive description of semi-presidentialism as presidentialism or even super-
presidentialism. In addition, the outlined semi-presidential systems of government 
can at some point of time not only actually, but even formally begin to function 
as presidential ones. However, there is still a significant difference between 
presidential and atypical semi-presidential systems of government, which is the 
formal responsibility of a government only to a president in the first case, but to 
a president and a parliament in the second case. Accordingly, the dependence of the 
system of government on the positioning of political parties in legislatures 
remains in the case of even formally atypical semi-presidentialism. 
At the same time, the right of a president not to force the government to 
resign in the event of the parliamentary vote of no confidence was deliberately 
                                               
41  Shugart, “Semi-Presidential Systems,” 323-51. 
42  Morgan-Jones and Schleiter, “Governmental Change in а President-Parliamentary 
Regime,” 145. 
43  Shugart, Comparative Executive-Legislative Relations. 
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enshrined in the constitutions of the post-Soviet countries with the aim of 
encouraging the presidentialization of atypical semi-presidential systems of 
government in such countries as Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, to a lesser 
extent Azerbaijan, and earlier Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
44
 This was done in 
order to increase the amount of resources controlled by a president in the 
executive, strengthen the institutional capacity of a president to overcome the 
resistance of other political actors and increase the degree of his or her autonomy 
in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet/prime minister–legislature”. 
Furthermore, the intention was to maintain such an option for semi-presidentialism, 
which, in the event of the president’s ignoring the parliamentary vote of no 
confidence in government (in the context of cabinet’s responsibility both to 
parliament and president), functions on the logic of presidentialism (in the context 
of cabinet’s responsibility solely to president). Taking into account the historical, 
institutional and functional peculiarities of semi-presidentialism in the countries 
under analysis, it is quite obvious that the recommendation nature of 
government responsibility to a parliament reduces or previously neutralized the 
very purpose and essence of the institution of the parliamentary vote of no 
confidence in government. Thus, from a methodological point of view, it is 
necessary to accentuate a separate class of atypical semi-presidentialism, where the 
resignation of the government is not the mandatory consequence of the 
parliamentary vote of no confidence in the government. Exactly as to distinguish 
a separate class of presidentialism with the institution of the parliamentary vote of 
no confidence in government, which also has an advisory meaning for the head 
of state. 
It is extremely important in this context that the actual and historical 
cases of atypical semi-presidentialism or presidentialism were or are specific 
(even despite the focus solely on the peculiarities of the votes of no confidence 
in governments) only to the post-Soviet undemocratic (autocratic and hybrid) 
political regimes. Therefore, it is theoretically, methodologically and 
empirically expedient to take into account the relationship between 
constitutionalism (the constitutional dimension of systems of government) and 
the real (political) institutional and sociological structure of undemocratic political 
regimes. The fact is that the constitutions and consequently the constitutional 
systems of government of the analyzed post-Soviet countries were designed at the 
time when their political regimes have already/yet been configured in the format of 
a so-called “competing authoritarianism” as defined by Steven Levitsky and 
Lucan Way, which conceptually includes both autocratic and some hybrid 
political regimes.
45
 Even though some of the post-Soviet countries, after the 
                                               
44  Osadchuk, “Konstytutsiini Referendumy/Konstytutsiini Reformy,” 73-80; Osadchuk, 
“Porivnialnyi Analiz Prezydentsializatsii.” 
45  Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Evolution of Post-Soviet Competitive 
Authoritarianism,” in Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War, 
A Defence of Gender-based Affirmative Action 77 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIX no. 1  2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
adoption of relevant constitutions and the configuration of the corresponding 
constitutional systems of government, became or were earlier the examples of a so-
called “closed” or “full”/“uncompetitive” authoritarianism.46 In particular, the 
political regimes of Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan, according to the 
indicators of the democracy index in 2006–2017, were classified as authoritarian 
ones; the political regimes of Georgia (in the period 2006–2013) and Kyrgyzstan (in 
the period 2006–2010) were treated as hybrid ones, while Russia’s political 
regime (in the period 2006–2017) changed from a hybrid (2006–2010) to an 
authoritarian (2010–2017) one.47 
In this sense, it is quite important to stress that the format of atypical 
semi-presidentialism in the framework of the competitive authoritarianism of the 
post-Soviet countries was selected when, on one hand, the democratic procedures 
and institutions were formally and declaratively considered as the main means of 
the obtaining and exercising political power, and, on the other hand, politicians 
have so often violated (and continue to do so) the formalized democratic 
procedures and institutions that the political regime gradually ceased to meet the 
“minimum standards of democracy.”48  
In sum, this means that the combination of real political competitiveness 
(as the formalized rule of competitiveness) and its dishonesty or injustice (as 
the actualized method of competitiveness) as an inherent characteristic of 
competitive authoritarianism (in particular, in various “arenas of competitiveness”, 
i.e. in electoral, legislative, judicial and informational ones) was the main 
prerequisite for the invention of atypical semi-presidentialism. On one hand, it 
was done in the form of a system of government (semi-presidentialism), which 
theoretically promotes maximum legitimization and hence democratization of 
power. On the other hand, it was seen as a veiled and instrumental logic (in the 
format of atypicality), which theoretically and practically determines the 
superpowers of one center of inter-institutional relations (mainly a president). 
Thus, it was argued that the cases of atypical semi-presidentialism with strong 
presidents and therefore at the junction with presidentialism, based on the 
atypical peculiarities of the procedures of the parliamentary votes of no 
confidence in governments, can lead to authoritarian (weakening of democracy) 
                                                                                                                   
eds. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 
183-235. 
46  Lytvyn, Atrybuty ta Riznovydy Napivprezydentskoi Systemy Pravlinnia v Yevropi, 107, 
565-68; Jean Blondel, “‘Presidentialism’ in the Ex-Soviet Union”, Japanese Journal of 
Political Science 13, no. 1 (2012): 1-36. 
47  “The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index,” The Economist, accessed 
December 1, 2018, https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/. 
48  Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “Elections Without Democracy: the Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 51-65; Vitaliy Lytvyn, 
Politychni Rezhymy Suchasnosti: Instytutsiini ta Protsesualni Vymiry Analizu 
(Contemporary Political Regimes: Institutional and Procedural Dimensions of Analysis) 
(Lviv: Lvivskyi Natsionalnyi Universytet imeni Ivana Franka (Ivan Franko National 
University of Lviv), 2014): 342-55. 
78  VITALIY S. LYTVYN, IHOR Y. OSADCHUK 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XIX  no. 1  2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tendencies in the cases of both cohabitation and super-majority. This means 
that atypical semi-presidentialism is an effective and manipulative tool of 
constitutional engineering in undemocratic political regimes, since dictators and 
autocrats skillfully consider the choice of atypical semi-presidentialism among 
other systems of government, in particular as a constitutional (institutional) and 
political (behavioral) instrument for “prolonging the political life” of ruling 
elites.
49
 This is true since atypical constructs of inter-institutional relations at 
the junction of semi-presidentialism and presidentialism have become and still 
remain the main choices of new, current and former constitutions of hybrid and 
autocratic political regimes of the post-Soviet countries, especially when they were 
massively described by the concept of competitive authoritarianism. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Based on the consideration and comparison of the six cases of the post-
Soviet atypical semi-presidentialism, in particular in regard to the parliamentary 
votes of no confidence in governments, but also in the case of regulating 
government responsibility directly to presidents, we can conclude that these cases 
of systems of government are very ambiguous and conterminous. 
On one hand, based on the existence of the institution of the parliamentary 
responsibility of cabinets, these systems of government formally and definitively 
tend to be closer to semi-presidentialism and would most likely be consistent with 
the executive dualism inherent for semi-presidentialism in the case of a democratic 
regime and tradition of governance. On the other hand, they demonstrate that even 
formally, especially in Azerbaijan (not to mention the political practice, which is 
undemocratic, that is in the form of hybrid or autocratic regimes), cabinets are a 
continuation of the monistic vertical of presidents, and their formalized, but atypical 
inexhaustible and incomplete responsibility to parliaments denies the semi-
presidential nature of these systems of government in favor of presidentialism. As a 
result, this determines that against the background of the definitions and 
generalizations of the various systems of government established by political theory 
there are formally and actually constructed “constitutional hybrids” in several 
undemocratic post-Soviet countries, which can be positioned both as the cases of 
atypical semi-presidentialism and incomplete presidentialism. It is quite obvious 
that such cases are unique and should be considered as exceptional ones, at least 
analytically. Just like the presidential systems of government with the institution of 
the recommendatory parliamentary vote of no confidence in governments. The 
stated conclusion opens the space for a broader study of atypical systems of 
government within the republican form of government. 
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Annexes 
 
 
Table 1. The minimally definitive logic of “origin” and “survival” of political/power 
institutions in the system of executive dualism under the conditions of semi-
presidentialism 
The minimal indicators of the 
definition and the institutions 
of semi-presidentialism 
President Prime minister / Government 
The mandatory logic of 
“origin” (formation) of the 
institutions 
Popular (direct or indirect) 
elections 
The vote of investiture or 
“silent” consent/confidence of 
legislature 
The mandatory logic of 
“survival” (responsibility) of 
the institutions 
Time-fixed mandate 
The vote of confidence and/or 
no confidence of legislature 
Source: Vitaliy Lytvyn, Atrybuty ta Riznovydy Napivprezydentskoi Systemy Pravlinnia v Yevropi: 
Instytutsiino-Protsesualnyi i Politychno-Povedinkovyi Aspekty (Attributes and Varieties of Semi-
Presidential System of Government in Europe: Institutional, Procedural, Political and Behavioral 
Aspects) (Lviv: Lvivskyi natsionalnyi universytet imeni Ivana Franka (Ivan Franko National 
University of Lviv), 2018): 83. 
 
 
Table 2. Institutional and procedural features, parameters and consequences of the 
parliamentary votes of no confidence in governments in atypical cases of the post-
Soviet semi-presidentialism 
Country 
The initiator 
of the vote 
of no 
confidence in 
government 
The type of the 
vote of no 
confidence in 
government 
The rule of 
decision on the 
vote of no 
confidence in 
government 
The 
frequency 
of the vote 
of no 
confidence 
in 
governmen
t 
The 
consequence
s of a 
successful 
vote of no 
confidence 
in 
government 
The 
consequence
s of an 
unsuccessful 
vote of no 
confidence 
in 
government 
Azerbaijan 
(1995–
2016) 
The 
unicameral 
parliament  
Usual  
(simple) 
The absolute 
majority (of 
the unicameral 
parliament) 
Not 
regulated 
by the 
constitutio
n 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government  
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
Azerbaijan 
(since 
2016) 
The 
unicameral 
parliament  
Usual  
(simple) 
The absolute 
majority (of 
the unicameral 
parliament) 
Not 
regulated 
by the 
constitutio
n 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government  
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
Belarus 
(since 
1996) 
1/3 of the 
nominal 
composition 
of the lower 
chamber of 
the 
bicameral 
Usual  
(simple) 
The absolute 
majority (of 
only the lower 
chamber of the 
bicameral 
parliament)  
Not 
regulated 
by the 
constitutio
n 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government 
/ 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
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parliament Government 
resignation 
or the 
dissolution 
of the lower 
chamber of 
the 
parliament  
Georgia 
(2004–
2013) 
1/3 of the 
nominal 
composition 
of the 
unicameral 
parliament 
Usual  
(simple) 
The absolute 
majority (of 
the unicameral 
parliament) 
90 days < 
the vote of 
no 
confidence 
< 100 days 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government 
/ 
Government 
resignation 
or its 
rejection / 
Government 
resignation 
or the 
dissolution 
of the 
parliament 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
1/3 of the 
nominal 
composition 
of the 
unicameral 
parliament 
Usual  
(simple)  
(“unconditional”
) 
The qualified 
majority 
(3/5 of the 
nominal 
composition of 
the unicameral 
parliament) 
> 6 months 
Government 
resignation 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
/ The 
moratorium 
on the vote 
of no 
confidence 
in 
government 
for six 
months 
Kazakhsta
n (1995–
2007) 
1/5 of the 
nominal 
composition 
of the 
bicameral 
parliament 
Usual  
(simple) 
The qualified 
majority 
(2/3 of the 
nominal 
composition of 
both 
chambers of 
the bicameral 
parliament) 
Not 
regulated 
by the 
constitutio
n 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government 
/ 
Government 
resignation 
or its 
rejection 
(with the 
possible 
dissolution 
of the 
parliament) 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
Kazakhsta
n (since 
2007) 
1/5 of the 
nominal 
composition 
of the lower 
Usual  
(simple) 
The absolute 
majority (of 
the lower 
chamber of the 
Not 
regulated 
by the 
constitutio
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
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chamber of 
the 
bicameral 
parliament/o
f the two 
chambers of 
the 
bicameral 
parliament 
bicameral 
parliament/bot
h chambers of 
the bicameral 
parliament) 
n of the 
government 
/ 
Government 
resignation 
or its 
rejection 
Kyrgyzsta
n (1993–
2003) 
The upper 
chamber of 
the 
bicameral 
parliament 
Usual  
(simple) 
The qualified 
majority 
 (2/3 of the 
nominal 
composition of 
the upper 
chamber of the 
bicameral 
parliament) 
Every 3 
months 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government 
/ 
Government 
resignation 
or its 
rejection / 
Government 
resignation 
or the 
dissolution 
of the upper 
chamber of 
the 
parliament 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
Kyrgyzsta
n (2003–
2007) 
The 
unicameral 
parliament  
Usual  
(simple) 
The qualified 
majority 
 (2/3 of the 
nominal 
composition of 
the unicameral 
parliament) 
Every 3 
months 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government 
/ 
Government 
resignation 
or its 
rejection / 
Government 
resignation 
or the 
dissolution 
of the 
parliament 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
Kyrgyzsta
n (2007–
2010) 
1/3 of the 
nominal 
composition 
of the 
unicameral 
parliament 
Usual  
(simple) 
The absolute 
majority (of 
the unicameral 
parliament) 
Every 3 
months 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government 
/ 
Government 
resignation 
or its 
rejection / 
Government 
resignation 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
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or the 
dissolution 
of the 
parliament 
Russia 
(since 
1993) 
The lower 
chamber of 
the 
bicameral 
parliament 
Usual  
(simple) 
The absolute 
majority (of 
only the lower 
chamber of the 
bicameral 
parliament)  
Every 3 
months 
Questioning 
the president 
on the 
resignation 
of the 
government 
/ 
Government 
resignation 
or its 
rejection / 
Government 
resignation 
or the 
dissolution 
of the lower 
chamber of 
the 
parliament 
The 
confidence 
in 
government 
Source: Made by the author based on the interpretation of the constitutions or the revisions of the 
constitutions of the countries that are subject to comparative analysis. 
 
